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I. INTRODUCTION
Religion is mainly an issue of faith. Sound public policy, by contrast, ought to
be based on evidence regarding the likely impact of particular governmental actions
on the actual lives and well-being of the intended beneficiaries and others affected
by such policy. In large part, the environment of pervasive, comprehensive
regulation,' within which the nursing facility (NF)2 industry 3 presently operates in
the United States, has evolved steadily over the past quarter century as a matter of
* Frederick A. White Distinguished Professor of Service, Wright State University School of Medicine;
Adjunct Faculty, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., with honors, The George Washington University,
1974; M.P.H., Harvard University, 1978; B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1971.
1. Regarding the regulatory environment surrounding the nursing facility industry, see infra Part II. One
nationally prominent geriatrician has noted that "[t]he role of regulation and external monitoring is more stringent
in nursing home care than in any other type of social service." Robert L. Kane, Assuring Quality in Nursing Home
Care, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 232,232 (1998).
2. In this Article, the terminology nursing facility (NF) is used to match the language employed in the
pertinent Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West Supp. 1999), and federal regulations. Medicare covers only
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West Supp. 1999).
3. On January 1, 1996, the United States had 16,840 NFs with 1.56 million residents occupying 1.76
million beds. JEFFREY A. RHOADES Er AL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NURSING
HOME-STRUCTURE AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS (1998).
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a political, almost quasi-religious, belief. This belief, by residents' advocates and
their legislative and regulatory allies, has been prodded on and abetted by the
popular media.4 This commitment to direct command and control regulation, as the
key to quality of care and quality of life, is often fueled by an ideological fervor
predicated on deep and abiding antipathy for any approach to public policy
questions faintly sympathetic to a substantial role for free enterprise and the private
marketplace in the delivery of health and human services.' This Article suggests
that, in fact, current and future nursing home residents may best be served by
examining the value of regulation with an attitude of healthy skepticism, rather than
automatically assuming regulation's superiority to other potential approaches that
are aimed at the same ultimate goals.
Specifically, this Article selectively reviews the relatively sparse, but
nevertheless helpful, literature that examines the impact of NF regulation. This
search is conducted to identify proof or disproof that such regulation, in practice,
has a positive impact on those it is intended to benefit. In this Article, the regulatory
approach is subjected to the developing analytic lens of "therapeutic
jurisprudence, ' 6 which, in other contexts, has asked whether legal "reforms" truly
help or hurt when all relevant factors are taken into account. This Article will
concentrate on the effects of micro-regulation, that is, statutes and administrative
rules that directly attempt to impose precise requirements on particular facets of the
quality of care and quality of life for NF residents.7 Macro concerns about how
4. Regarding the popular media's overwhelmingly pro-regulatory bias see, for example, They Didn't Live
So Long for This, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1999, at A20 (arguing that "[t]here are signs that the Medicaid and
Medicare authorities are beginning to clamp down on nursing home performance... [tioward a better end.").
5. See, e.g., Toby S. Edelman, The Politics of Long-Term Care at the Federal Level and Implications for
Quality, GENERATIONS, Winter 1997-1998, at 37, 37 (railing against the nursing facility "industry's ability to
exploit the political climate of deregulation and deficit reduction to further its long-standing interest in decreasing
public oversight and enforcement"); Iris C. Freeman, Nursing Home Politics at the State Level and Implications
for Quality: The Minnesota Example, GENERATIONS, winter 1997-1998, at 44, 48 (lamenting that, in terms of
current nursing facility politics, "[t]he dollar issues dominate. Enforcement is in limbo, and, when all is said and
done, the state may prefer to leave nursing home quality to a new stratum of fiscal intermediaries--the managed
care organizations whom the state will pay to pay nursing homes."); Joani Latimer, The Essential Role of
Regulation to Assure Quality in Long-Term Care, GENERATIONS, winter 1997-1998, at 10, 10 (arguing that "[i]n
this case [nursing home quality assurance] .... the market mechanism does not fit").
6. Regarding therapeutic jurisprudence, see generally infra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
7. Command and control regulation should be contrasted with regulation intended to financially motivate
providers to take action to improve the quality of care they provide by linking payment amounts to measured
resident outcomes. See Kane, supra note 1, at 232 (arguing that command and control regulation deals with
structural and process questions, while regulatory incentives aim at the important goal of improving outcomes);
Robert L. Kane, Improving the Quality of Long-Term Care, 273 JAMA 1376 (1995) (arguing that the traditional
regulatory approach concentrates on avoiding catastrophes, while an approach that rewards desired outcomes can
achieve a positive good); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION, STUDY OF PRIVATE ACCREDITATION OFNURSING HOMES, REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND NON-
REGULATORY INCENTIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURVEY AND CERIFICATION SYSTEM (visited July 21,
1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaidlexectv2.htm> [hereinafter HCFA] (reviewing research linking payment
to improved resident outcomes) (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review). Other than incidentally, this Article
does not dal with the very important subject of such financial incentives.
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regulatory or marketplace approaches might reform the larger system of long term
care financing and delivery 9 for the better are beyond the scope'0 of this Article."
8. Regarding marketplace approaches to reform of the larger long term care system, see Marshall B. Kapp,
Health Care in the Marketplace: Implications for Decisionally Impaired Consumers and Their Surrogates and
Advocates, 24 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1 (1999) (arguing that, among other reasons for enhancing the degree of consumer
choice and control in long term care, this will have a positive effect on the quality of services provided).
9. For example, how these approaches might discourage NF placement in favor of home and community-
based services, or how they might make long term care more affordable for consumers. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
ANDHUMANSERVICES, OFFICEOFINSPECTORGENERAL,EARLYEFFECTS OFTHEPROSPECIVEPAYMENTS SYSTEM
ON ACCESS To SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES (1999) (assessing whether the prospective payment system initiated
in 1998 for skilled nursing facilities is causing access problems for Medicare beneficiaries).
10. A thorough examination of private accreditation initiatives in the realm of NF quality assurance is also
left to others. See JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR LONG-TERM CARE (1999) [hereinafter JCAHO MANUAL]. Further, while
acknowledging that regulation and litigation frequently are complementary rather than alternative strategies for
achieving quality assurance and residents' rights protection objectives, this Article abstains from a careful exegesis
of the complicated subjects of tort and contract law and the impact of civil litigation on the well-being of its
intended beneficiaries in the NF contexL Regarding tort actions in the NF context, see generally Marshall B. Kapp,
Malpractice Liability in Long-Term Care: A Changing Environment, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1235 (1991)
(discussing areas of potential NF liability). Regarding the therapeutic jurisprudence implications of tort law see,
for example, Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115 (1993)
(discussing the prevailing theories of human behavior and analyzing whether tort law deterrence theory is in
accord with any of these theories of human behavior); Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World a Better Place
Through Tort Law?: Through the Therapeutic Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 739 (1993) (exploring
tort law's therapeutically driven agenda); Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited
Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409 (1992) (exploring the therapeutic potential of tort law in light
of the relationship between mental or emotional problems and accident causation). Regarding contract actions in
the NF context, see generally Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home's Good Faith Duty "To" Care: Redefining a
Fragile Relationship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217 (1994). For a look at the impact of civil
litigation in the NF context, see generally NURSING HOME LITIGATION: INVESTIGATION AND CASE PREPARATION
(Patricia W. Iyer ed., 1999) (educating plaintiffs' attorneys on how to sue nursing facilities). Fear of litigation,
as well as of regulatory sanctions, has motivated many NFs to put into place internal risk management programs.
See generally ANDREW D. WEINBERG, RISK MANAGEMENT IN LONG-TERM CARE: A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE
(1998) (educating nursing home administration and staff how to reduce their likelihood of being sued and held
legally liable). The actual impact of such risk management efforts on resident quality of care and quality of life
has not been formally evaluated. See infra note 107 and accompanying text (setting forth a suggestion that risk
management programs may actually work in opposition to the free exercise of residents' rights); see also Jennifer
L. Williamson, The Siren Sound of the Elderly: Florida's Nursing Homes and the Dark Side of Chapter 400, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 423 (1999) (pointing out other dangers engendered by a climate that allows excessive private
litigation against nursing facilities).
11. On the distinction between microanalytic (focusing on particular rules, decisions, and roles), and
macroanalytic (focusing on a whole "body of law"), applications of therapeutic jurisprudence to an examination
of the law's impact, see David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY 811, 817 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996). For a detailed macroanalytic
discussion of long term care systemic reform, see ROSALIE A. KANE ET AL, THE HEART OF LONG-TERM CARE
(1998) (setting out a series of alternative LTC models for providing both services and housing).
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II. NURSING FACILITY REGULATION
A. Sources of Regulation
Regulation of the NF industry and the accompanying advocacy network 2 aimed
at improving the quality of care and quality of life (including respect for personal
rights) for residents are, to grossly understate the situation, multifaceted. 13 The
regulatory octopus t4 includes voluntary forms of accreditation dispensed by private
agencies such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO),15 internal and external utilization review (UR), quality
assurance (QA) mechanisms, malpractice lawsuits based on tortious behavior or
breach of contract, and the threat of criminal prosecution. Mandates of the
Americans With Disabilities Act 16 and the Rehabilitation Act 7 regarding
affirmative obligations to accommodate the disabled are fully applicable to NFs as
well.'
5
The most significant influence on provider behavior, and the one on which this
Article concentrates, is exerted by mandatory conditions set forth by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) through the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA). The DHHS oversees all NFs that wish to be
certified to participate in the Medicare' 9 and Medicaid 0 programs. Enforcement of
mandatory standards occurs through regular survey2' and certification by a state
administrative agency (usually the state health department) that has been designated
by contract between the specific state and the federal government. HCFA provides
12. See Jeanie Kayser-Jones & Marshall B. Kapp, Advocacy for the Menially Impaired Elderly: A Case
Study Analysis, 14 AM. J. L. & MED. 353 (1989) (using a case example to discuss various forms of available
advocacy for vulnerable nursing facility residents).
13. See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHE.LL 155-72 (2d
ed. 1998) (providing an overview of the many forms of nursing facility regulation); Lori Owen, Portfolio 12:
Rights of Long-Term Care Facility Residents, ELDER LAW PORTFOLIO SERIES, Feb. 1996 (same); NAT'L HEALTti
LAWYERS Assoc., THE LONG TERM CARE HANDBOOK (1991) (same).
14. This author first used this image in Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Decisionmakingfor Older Adults In
Institutional Settings: Is Beneficence Dead in an Age of Risk Management? 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 29,30 (1995).
15. JCHAO MANUAL, supra note 10. Regarding the potential for the federal government approving
"deemed statues" for the JCAHO or other private accrediting bodies for NFs (i.e., treating that organization's
approval of a NF as sufficient to satisfy Medicare/Medicaid certification standards for Medicare/Medicaid
certification purposes), see 58 Fed. Reg. 61816, 61837-61843 (1993); HCFA, supra note 7, at 6-16; see also
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-197R, SELECTION OF MEDICARE DEEMING ORGANIZATIONS
(1999) (identifying HCFA's criteria for granting deemed status to voluntary accrediting bodies and its process for
providing ongoing oversight).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1999).
17. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1999).
18. Vicki Gottlich, Protection forNursing Facility Residents UndertheADA, GENERATIONS, winter 1994,
at 43, 43.
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West Supp. 1999).
20. Id. § 1396.
21. Such a survey must be conducted no less often than once every 15 months at each NF.
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the state survey agency with interpretive guidelines, compiled in the Medicaid State
Operations Manual,2 and a form for use during NF surveys.z Frequently, state
surveys examine NFs for compliance with both the federal certification standards
and state licensure requirements. Violation of federal standards may lead to
decertification of the NF from participation in Medicare or Medicaid financing.
Moreover, HCFA is empowered under the "look behind" statute24 to conduct its
own validation surveys of NFs and to terminate a NF's participation in the
Medicaid program despite findings of compliance by the state survey agency.
In addition, failure to fulfill state imposed licensure requirements,25 which are
allowed to be more, but not less, demanding than federal standards,26 may result in
serious penalties short of decertification. In addition to delicensure from conducting
business altogether, sanctions may include a range of intermediate interventions
including civil fines, and restrictions on admissions or receivership.
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (hereinafter OBRA
87),27 Congress enacted the Nursing Home Quality Reform Act.28 This Act is
modeled on many of the recommendations made in a 1986 Institute of Medicine
report that Congress had directed HCFA to commission. 29 Passage of the 1987
legislation demonstrated the impatience of Congress and the courts3 with what they
22. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2)(C)(i), 1396r(g)(2)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring state survey
agencies to use this protocol in conducting federal certification surveys). The current State Operations Manual,
Appendices P and PP (Nursing Facility Survey Protocols and Interpretive Guidelines), Medicare Transmittal 10,
was forwarded by HCFA to state survey agencies on July 1, 1999. The current version of the State Operations
Manual is available at <http:www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/LTCS/LTCSHMPG.htm>.
23. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/IHEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT, 6-7 (1998) (explaining HCFA's classification of
deficiencies and their accompanying levels of severity and compliance status).
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(33)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
25. Licensure standards are imposed and enforced by the state under its inherent police power to protect
and promote the general health, safety, and welfare of the community. See FRANK GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
MANUAL 99-101 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining the state police power as applied to health care licensure requirements).
26. Regarding state NF licensure requirements see, for example, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.011
(Anderson 1997 & Supp. 1999) (describing the Ohio licensure statute); David F. Bragg, Dealing With Nursing
Home Neglect: The Need for Private Litigation, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997) (describing Texas law); Tracey
Lazarus et al., Don't Make Them Leave Their Rights at the Door: A Recommended Model State Statute to Protect
the Rights of the Elderly in Nursing Homes, 4J. CONTEMP. HEALTHL. &POL'Y 321 (1988) (discussing the District
of Columbia licensure statute).
27. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).
28. Codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(a)-(h) and 1396r(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1999). See generally Toby
Edelman, The Nursing Home Reform Law: The Federal Response, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 453 (1993)
(discussing the Nursing Home Quality Reform Act).
29. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES (1986)
[hereinafter IOM report].
30. See Smith v. O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 289,299 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd sub. nom. Estate of Smith v.
Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 590 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that DHHS had a duty to ensure "high quality care" in
federally-funded NFs).
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and the public perceived as HCFA's ineffectual regulation of NFs. 31 OBRA 87
amended Titles 18 (Medicare) and 19 (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act to
require substantial upgrading in NF quality and enforcement in a number of areas.
To implement this legislation, HCFA published final regulations on February
2, 1989, becoming effective on October 1, 1990.32 Additional final regulations were
published on September 26, 1991. 33 Among the most important requirements
imposed by these regulations are those relating to: ensuring resident privacy and
decisional rights regarding accommodations, medical treatment, personal care,
visits, written and telephone communications, and meetings with others;
34
maintaining confidentiality of personal and clinical records;35 guaranteeing facility
access and visitation rights to persons of the resident's choosing;36 requiring
issuance of notice of rights at the time of admission;37 ensuring proper use of
physical restraints and psychoactive drugs;31 protecting resident funds being
managed in the facility;39 ensuring transfer and discharge rights, and issuing related
notices;40 requiring minimum staffing levels regarding nursing and social work
coverage;4' requiring comprehensive resident assessments and individualized care
plans drawn in accordance with those assessments;4 requiring state prescreening
of all prospective NF admittees;43 and prohibiting admission of individuals with
mental illness or mental retardation unless those individuals are found specifically
to need nursing services.44
In 1994, HCFA published a final rule governing survey, certification and
enforcement of Requirements of Participation for Medicare SNFs and Medicaid
31. The IOM report and resulting legislation and regulation emanated from an atmosphere of highly
publicized scandals regarding the atrocious quality of care discovered in many NFs. See generally BRUCE C.
VLADEK, UNLOVING CARE (1980) (condemning conditions in most nursing facilities at that time). For a
description of the historical background leading to enactment of OBRA 87 and promulgation of implementing
regulations see, for example, HCFA, supra note 7, at 1-2; Mary Kathleen Robbins, Nursing Home Reform:
Objective Regulation or Subjective Decisions? 11 T.M. COOLEYL. REV. 185, 186-91 (1994); Rebecca Elon & L.
Gregory Pawlson, The Impact of OBRA on Medical Practice Within Nursing Fdilities, 40 J. AM. GERIATRICS
SoC'Y 958,959 (1992).
32. 54 Fed. Reg. 5316 (1989).
33. 56 Fed. Reg. 48826 (1991).
34. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(e)(1) (2000).
35. Id. § 483.10(e)(2).
36. Id. § 483.10(k).
37. Id. § 483.10(b).
38. Id. § 483.13(a); see also infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
39. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(c) (2000).
40. Id. § 483.12(a).
41. Id. § 483.15(g).
42. Id. § 483.20(d); see also infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of issues concerning NF admission, see Marshall B. Kapp, The "Voluntary" Status
of Nursing FacilityAdmissions: Legal, Practical and Public Policy Implications, 24 NEW ENO. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFiNEMENT 1 (1998).
44. 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(0 (2000); see also infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
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NFs.45 This rule, which became effective July 1, 1995, made significant changes to
the survey and certification process and describes the intermediate sanctions that
states and the federal government have available to respond to facilities that do not
meet federal standards. On March 18, 1999, HCFA published a final rule (with a
comment period) that gives states and HCFA new authority to impose civil money
penalties in the event of noncompliance. 6
As this Article is being prepared, the federal appetite for new NF regulations
continues unsatiated. For example, on March 25, 1999, President Clinton signed
into law the Nursing Home Resident Protection Amendments, which, among other
items, protect NF residents from eviction when an NF voluntarily withdraws from
participation in the Medicaid program.47
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis
Many factors, such as ownership type, facility size, mix of payment sources,
annual expenditures, and the vagaries of the local labor market, operating singly or
in combination, may affect any NF's quality of care.48 In this Article, however, the
variable of interest is the existing set of applicable command and control
regulations governing the NF's daily operation. The analytic model through which
this variable is examined is that of "therapeutic jurisprudence" (hereinafter referred
to as "TJ").
The National Citizens' Coalition on Nursing Home Reform (NCCNHR) has
correctly insisted that "the regulatory system should be focused on what we do for
the residents who live in nursing homes, not about what we do to providers." '49
Geriatrician Robert Kane observes:
45. 59 Fed. Reg. 56116 (1994).
46. 64 Fed. Reg. 13354 (1999).
47. See also Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Reform: A Historical Account of the
Recent Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 ELDER L. J. 267, 267 (1999) (explaining that the Chair of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging believes new legal initiatives may be necessary to assure that Congressional intent regarding
quality of care is carried out). The states' appetite for more expansive NF regulation also continues unabated. See
Amy Pyle & Dan Morain, Sweeping Reforms in Nursing Care OK'd, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9,1999, at A3 (describing
a 1999 California statute).
48. See generally William E. Aaronson et al., Do For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Nursing Homes Behave
Differently? 34 GERONTOLOGIST 775 (1994); Mark A. Davis, Nursing Home Quality: A Review andAnalysis, 48
MED. CARE REV. 129 (1991).
49. Memorandum from Sarah Greene Burger, Executive Director, The National Citizens' Coalition for
Nursing Home Reform to Karen Schoeneman, HCFA (March 12,1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
see also Charlene Harrington et al., Stakeholders' Opinions Regarding Important Measures of Nursing Home
Qualityfor Consumers, 14 AM.J. MED. QUAL. 124 (1999) (providing that nursing home advocates, administrators,
regulators, ombudsmen, and nursing service directors all agree that quality of care and quality of life are the most
important yardsticks against which to measure how well nursing facilities are doing their job).
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In an area like long-term care, where so little is established about the
relationship between process and outcomes, there is a strong argument for
concentrating regulatory activities on assuring that satisfactory outcomes
are achieved. Such a philosophy is at odds with practice. Often when
uncertainty about the best path to follow is greatest, the press for orthodoxy
becomes most intense. 0
The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence aims to upset that orthodoxy.
In its simplest terms, TJ is a mode of recognizing that every law is an
experiment of sorts51 and insisting that proponents of particular legal interventions,
to paraphrase a popular motion picture of the late 1990's, "show us the empirical
results. 52 Over a century ago, Henry Ward Beecher remarked that, "[i]t usually
takes a hundred years to make a law, and then after it has done its work, it usually
takes a hundred years to get rid of it."
'5 3
As described by Professor David Wexler m one of the original developers-
along with Professor Bruce Winick--of the rapidly expanding55 modem version of
the notion that laws' effectiveness should not be taken for granted:
The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective suggests that the law itself can
be seen to function as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent. Legal rules,
legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors... constitute social forces
that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic
consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that we be sensitive to
those consequences, rather than ignore them, and that we ask whether the
law's antitherapeutic consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic
consequences enhanced .... 56
In other words, TJ "is an interdisciplinary approach to law that builds on the
basic insight that law is a social force that has inevitable (if unintended)
50. Kane, supra note 1, at 234.
51. Justice Brandeis envisioned the states as democracy's experimental laboratories. New York State Ice
Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52. JERRY MAGUIRE (Tri-Star/Sony Pictures 1996) (paraphrasing the character Rod Tidwell's line "Show
me the money!").
53. HENRY IV. BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 239 (1858).
54. See generally DAVIDB. NVEXLER,THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE: THELAW AS ATHERAPEUTICAGENT
(1990) (setting out the theory and purpose of therapeutic jurisprudence analysis).
55. The University of Puerto Rico School of Law has recently created an International Network on
Therapeutic Jurisprudence. See Juan D. Ramirez, Inauguration-Therapeutic Jurisprudence Forum of the
International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rco 95
(1998).
56. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Clinical Practice, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 453 (1996).
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consequences for the ... health and ... functioning of those it affects." 57 It
embodies an attitude toward the law of legal pragmatism or realism. 58 Although
originating specifically in the mental health field,59 TJ has been expanded
vigorously beyond that arena,60 and there is no good reason why it should not be
employed to analyze the law as it affects older persons generally, and NF residents
specifically. Indeed, the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, in
1997, established an expert committee to examine the means for assessing,
overseeing, and improving the quality of long term care and the practical and policy
challenges of achieving a consistent quality of care. Among the questions assigned
to this study were:
What is known about the impact of long-term care regulation, especially
the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987, on such matters as: the use of
physical and chemical restraints; advance care planning; provision of
adequate nutrition; identification of substandard facilities or programs; and
public access to information on quality of care?
61
TJ is an "enterprise designed to produce scholarship that is particularly useful
for law reform." 62 As the author of this Article suggests elsewhere, "[p]ublic policy
making for the elderly ought to be a continuous, iterative process for which
improvement in content depends (or ought to depend) on accurate feedback in
response to these kinds of inquiry., 63 There are several cogent arguments for
pursuing this practical, utilitarian enterprise in the arena of NF regulation.
57. Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and
Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL W. L. REV. 15, 17 (1997).
58. For a modem description of the pragmatic approach to law making, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 4-7 (1995). For a discussion of how TJ relates to other reputable schools of legal analysis, see
Bruce J. Vinick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 184 (1997).
59. See, e.g., A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of the Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment in
BRUCEJ. INICK, THERIGHTTO REFUSE MENTALHEALTH TREATMENT 327-44 (1997) [hereinafter WINICK, THE
RIGHT TO REFUSE] (applying therapeutic jurisprudence analysis to a mental health issue); BRUCE J. WINICK,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1997) (applying therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis to mental health issues).
60. See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David
B. Wexler & Bruce J. winick eds. 1996).
61. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HCSX-H-97-02-A, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, CONTINUING TO
IMPROVE QUALITY IN LONG TERM CARE (1997).
62. David B. Wexler, Some Thoughts and Observations on the Teaching of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
35 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUENO 273, 274 (1996). Cf GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (providing a scholarly analysis of the failure of court
involvement in many areas, for example, education, to achieve meaningful long term social change).
63. Marshall B. Kapp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Older Lives: Well-Intended Laws and Unexamined
Results, 2 J. ETHICS L. & AGING, 3-4 (1996).
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First, in sharp contrast to the prevailing mentality when the Institute of
Medicine issued its 1986 report' on which the OBRA 87 legislation was
predicated, there is a widespread contemporary realization that any benefits of
regulation must be carefully weighed against the very real economic and social
costs imposed by regulatory compliance and oversight.6 In recognition of this
reality, in 1994 DHHS issued a "plan for periodic review of rules." The review
plan, which was initiated in response to Executive Order 12866, calls for a review
of all DHHS rules to determine which "should receive early, in-depth review and
revisions to reduce regulatory burdens.' 67
In the case of NF regulation, the costs to the individual facility are ultimately
borne by its residents. For the resident, regulatory costs may take the form of higher
monetary fees for services (for privately paying residents), decreased quality of care
due to staffing cutbacks made in response to budgetary constraints, or lessened
availability of valuable but non-mandated activities.s Moreover, it is ironic that
regulations narrowly prescribing that providers make specific things occur at
specific times and in specific ways often may have an unintended consequence for
residents' rights. In effect, regulation can limit residents' rights rather than
empowering them in their choice and freedom.69
Second, we need to investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of NF command
and control regulation in order to weigh this strategy vis-a-vis alternative ways of
accomplishing the same QA and residents' rights ends.70 Alternative strategies
64. IOM report, supra note 29, at 210 (stating that:
mhe Committee chose not to divert any of its limited time and resources to this purpose [considering
the costs of recommended regulation]. It concentrated on developing recommendations that will
improve the regulatory system's ability to ensure better quality of care and quality of life for nursing
home residents [regardless of the cost entailed].).
65. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUrY OF PRIVATIZATION AND
EMPOWERMENT 51-53 (1996) (noting the costs entailed for nursing facilities to comply with regulatory
requirements); Jeremy Sugarman et al., The Cost of Ethics Legislation: A Look at the Patient Self-Determination
Act, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHics J. 387, 389-95 (1993) (estimating the financial costs to a hospital from complying
with the federal Patient Self-Determination Act); John F. Schnelle & Cornelia Beck, Costs of Promoting
Independence, 47J. Am. GERiATRIcS Soc'Y 1151 (1999) (arguing that costs must be analyzed for all areas subject
to OBRA regulations).
66. 59 Fed. Reg. 3040 (1994).
67. Id. at 3041.
68. See Troy J. Crotts & Daniel A. Martinez, The Nursing Home Residents' Rights Act-A Good Idea Gone
Bad!, 26 STETSON L. REV. 599,612-13 (1996) (criticizing Florida's Residents' Rights Act for its potential adverse
effects on both residents and the nursing facility industry).
69. See HANDLER, supra note 65, at 149-50 (illustrating how long term care consumers may have choices
constrained because of the regulatory straightjacket into which providers are placed); Kapp, supra note 14, at 32-
44 (illustrating how nursing facility residents may have their choices constrained because regulatory requirements
prevent nursing facilities from honoring certain resident choices); see also infra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text.
70. See generally Kane, supra note 7 (suggesting alternative means).
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include market mechanisms, professional education, different payment systems,7 t
private accreditation, and privately initiated QA interventions.72 These various QA
strategies are not mutually exclusive and combinations of approaches may be
conducted simultaneously. Nonetheless, attaining the most efficacious combination
(i.e., knowing into which "basket" we should be placing our strategic "eggs")
necessitates evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of each component,
including government command and control regulation. It is not enough to simply
inquire whether regulation "works;" we must also ask the next question, namely,
whether it works better than other possible options. Put differently, do the benefits
of pursuing a regulatory strategy outweigh the opportunity costs of foregoing the
alternatives?
The questions posed by one set of authors, ordinarily associated with a pro-
regulatory stance, are instructive:
[W]hat are the consequences of extensive reforms [in NF regulation] on
structure and process? Does the amount of political capital compliance
effort associated with these reforms retard efforts to develop more effective
outcomes of care measures? Can federal policymakers ever effectively
measure the full costs to states of complying with federal standards? If the
federal government is not willing to bear the full cost of a program but
instead insists that states share in the cost, should Congress be free to
dictate standards?73
Evaluating the impact of specific regulations utilizing a TJ model is hardly an
easy task, which may explain at least in part why this exercise is done so seldomly.
There are some inherent limitations in applicable social science methodologies.74
For instance, the effect of regulation on outcomes must be separated out from that
of the numerous other variables that may influence NF quality.75 In addition, in
cases where regulation appears to exert little, if any, positive tangible influence,
determining whether the problem lies in weak enforcement rather than in the
content of the regulation itself is essential information for plotting future public
71. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997), section 4432 required the
implementation of a prospective payment system (PPS) for SNFs covering all costs (routine, ancillary and capital)
related to covered services furnished to beneficiaries under Part A of the Medicare program. The PPS provides
for per diem payment rates adjusted for case mix, or the resource intensity of each resident, and for geographic
variation in wages.
72. See HCFA, supra note 7, at 5-16 (addressing the private accreditation alternatives in depth).
73. RAND E. ROSENBLATr Er AL, LAW OFTHE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1212 (1997).
74. Winick, supra note 58, at 184; Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to
Ponder, I PSYCHOL, PUB. POL'Y, &L. 193, 204-07 (1995).
75. See Catherine Hawes et al., The OBRA-87 Nursing Home Regulations and Implementation of the
Resident Assessment Instrument: Effects on Process Quality, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOc'Y 977, 983-84 (1997)
(explaining that even the strongest supporters of federal regulation admit the difficulty of proving that positive
change should be attributed to new regulation); supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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policy directions, 76 but accurately evaluating the respective explanations is usually
difficult. Moreover, quality of care and quality of life necessarily remain slippery
concepts. In recently announcing a large grant award for a research project entitled
Assessing and Improving Nursing Home Quality of Care, the Commonwealth Fund
stated, "[r]eports of poor nursing home quality abound in the media, yet simple
measurement tools that could be used to gauge and report the quality of these
facilities are lacking."
Despite these challenges, some credible TJ empirical analyses of current NF
regulation have been carried out (although not explicitly under the TJ label). The
next Part reviews the results that have begun to emerge from these investigations.
mF[. THE IMPACT OF REGULATION
A. General Quality of Care and Quality of Life
In terms of OBRA 87's impact on the general quality of care and quality of life
within NFs, the overall verdict to date has been largely, although not unanimously,
positive.78 Not surprisingly, past79 and current ° HCFA Administrators have given
the law (and, not coincidentally, themselves) a glowing endorsement, by pointing
to such post-OBRA quality indicators as reduction in resident dehydration,
decreased utilization of indwelling urinary catheters, lowering of the hospitalization
rate, and an increase in the number of hearing impaired residents who now have
hearing aids."' Interviews with nursing home employees, regulators, advocates, and
representatives of professional associations have yielded favorable perceptions
regarding the law's impact.8 2 It has also been suggested that physicians are now
76. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS
NEEDED To STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS (1999) (blaming weak enforcement
efforts); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/IHEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS
PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT (1998) (blaming weak enforcement for quality problems). Cf.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHEHS-99-154R, NURSING HOME OVERSIGHT: INDUSTRY EXAMPLES Do
NOT DEMONSTRATETHAT REGULATORY ACTIONS WERE UNREASONABLE (1999) (rejecting claims of the nursing
home industry that state surveyors are overzealous in their enforcement of regulations).
77. COMMONWEALTH FUND, RECENT GRANTS AWARDED BY THE BOARD OFTRUSE 3 (1999).
78. See CATHERINE HAWES, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ASSURING NURSING HOME QUALITY: THE
HISTORY AND IMPACT OFFEDERALSTANDARDS IN OBRA-1987 (1996) (reviewing some of the literature available
at that time).
79. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Past, Present, andFuture of Nursing Home Quality, 275 JAMA 425 (1996).
But see Bruce C. Vladeck & Marvin Feuerberg, Unloving Care Revisited, GENERATIONS, Winter 1995-1996, at
9 (the same individual with a more limited endorsement of OBRA's positive impact).
80. See Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, Message from the Administrator, HCFA HEALTH WATCH, Aug. 1998,
at 3; HCFA, supra note 7, at 19-21, 22-35.
81. See Vladeck, supra note 79.
82. See Karen Dorman Marek et al., OBRA '87: Has It Resulted in Better Quality of Care? 22 J.
GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 28 (1996).
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more thoroughly involved in resident care and the QA process in NFs than ever
before.
83
Much of the existing empirical research has focused on OBRA's requirement
that the NF use a standardized Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI) to collect
data, consistent with a mandated Minimum Data Set (MDS) and standardized
Resident Assessment Protocols (RAPs), from each new resident to assist with
individualized care planning for that resident."I The RAI has been praised as an
important tool, valuable in this endeavor and contributing to improved results by
several research teams. Among the QA improvements cited in favorable
evaluations of the RAI are: more accurate information in residents' medical
records;86 greater comprehensiveness of written care plans;8 7 reduced use of
indwelling urinary catheters;88 higher rates of residents executing advance medical
directives; 9 more resident participation in activities; 9° better use of toileting
programs for residents with bowel incontinence; 91 and improvements in specific
health conditions (namely, dehydration, falls, decubitus, vision problems, stasis
ulcers, poor teeth, and malnutrition). 92 Additionally, advocates for the RAI argue
that the information generated through the instrument can be used to evaluate a
particular NF's performance according to certain quality indicators, which results
in turn can inform both government and private QA initiatives in the future.93
While the evidence cited in support of OBRA 87's salutary influence on
resident outcomes is encouraging, some commentators sagely urge caution before
embracing the regulatory strategy too wholeheartedly. According to one noted
geriatrician, "[1l]ike most clinical studies, there are many potential pitfalls in the
interpretation and applicability of the findings."' One team of authors found that
83. See Elon & Pawlson, supra note 31; Jonathan M. Evans et al., Medical Care of Nursing Home
Residents, 70 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 694 (1995).
84. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 483.20 (West Supp. 1999); 62 Fed. Reg. 67174 (1997).
85. See Marilyn J. Rantz et al., Minimum Data Set and Resident Assessment Instrument: Can Using
Standardized Assessment Improve Clinical Practice and Outcomes of Care? 25 J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING
35 (1999); Hawes et al., supra note 75; Charles D. Phillips et al., Geriatric Assessment in Nursing Homes in the
United States: Impact of a National Program, GENERATIONS, winter 1997-1998, at 15.
86. See Hawes et al., supra note 75, at 979, 981.
87. See id. at 981-82.




92. Brant E. Fries et al., Effect of the National Resident Assessment Instrument on Selected Health
Conditions and Problems, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 994 (1997).
93. David R. Zimmerman, The Power of Information: Using Resident Assessment Data to Assure and
Improve the Quality of Nursing Home Care, GENERATIONS, Winter 1997-1998, at 52, 52.
94. Joseph G. Ouslander, The Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI: Promise and Pitfalls, 45 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 975,975 (1997); see also Mark Snowden, et al., Validity and Responsiveness of the Minimum
Data Set, 47 J. AM. GRIATRICS SOc'Y 1000 (1999) (finding that the MDS may be limited as an outcome
assessment instrument); J. Johnson-Pawlson & Donna L. Infeld, Nurse Staffing and Quality of Care in Nursing
Facilities, 22 J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 36, 44 (1996) (providing that state survey data "is at best gross
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while the RAI may have improved the quality of care of NF residents by reducing
overall rates of decline in important areas of resident function, this innovation may
have created tradeoffs in that it may have reduced improvement rates in some other
areas of function. 95 A group of NF medical directors suggests that the regulations
may even be counterproductive:
Those with the most training are often forced to preoccupy themselves with
administrative responsibilities such as required documentation. The
documentation required for the minimum data set (MDS), resident
assessment protocols (RAPs), and care planning often takes time away
from staff supervision, staff education, and direct patient care activities. 6
Even if one disagrees with that negative assessment, enthusiasm for the efficacy
of regulation certainly ought to be tempered by consistently emerging reminders,
coming from credible bodies such as the U.S. General Accounting Office97 and the
DHHS Office of Inspector General, 98 of the substantial deficiencies still found in
the general quality of care provided by many NFs. According to an experienced
advocate, "In spite of extensive regulation, and perhaps in some ways because of
[such regulations], for many years serious abuse and neglect of nursing home
residents has continued to occur."99 Even the then-Administrator of HCFA admitted
that, despite the fact that we indisputably can observe improved quality of care and
quality of life today as compared with pre-OBRA days, "while we've come a long
way, the journey is far from over."' ° While submitting that, "[n]o one would argue
with the desirability of using a systematic, structured approach to assessing
measures of how well nursing care is provided").
95. See Charles D. Phillips et al., Association ofthe Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI) with Changes
in Function, Cognition, and Psychosocial Status, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 986 (1997).
96. Paul Y. Takahashi et al., The Physician's Response to Institutional Mistreatment, 1 ETHICS, L. & AGING
REV. (forthcoming 2000) (on file with author).
97. SeeGENERALACCOUNTINGOFFICE, GAO/HEHS-9946,NURSINGHOMES:ADDrTONALSTEPSNEEDED
TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OFFEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS (1999) (blaming weak enforcement efforts);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS PERSIST
DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT (1998) (blaming weak enforcement for quality problems).
98. U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICEOFINSPCTOR GENERAL, QUALITY OF CARE IN
NURSING HOMES: AN OVERVIEW (1999); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-6, NURSING
HOME CARE: ENHANCING HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY (1999)
(reporting significant failures in the monitoring of nursing home quality of care).
99. See Bragg, supra note 26, at 3-4; see also Harriet A. Fields, Closed for Good, WASH. POST, June 22,
1997, at Cl (describing horrible conditions for residents at D.C. Village, the now boarded up nursing home once
operated by the District of Columbia).
100. Vladeck & Feuerberg, supra note 79, at 9; see also Rebecca J. Coccia & Elizabeth A. Cameron, Caring
for Elderly Individuals in Nursing Homes, 25 L GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 38, 40 (1999) (lamenting that
substandard care continues to be provided in nursing homes more than a decade after the OBRA reforms were
enacted).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
residents," Kane maintains that, "if one were to argue strongly for an RAI effect,
one might be disappointed at the modest results reported. 10'
B. Residents' Rights
Assuring and enhancing residents' rights has consistently been one of the
primary goals of federal and state NF regulation."° Among other rationales, the
creation and enforcement of detailed residents' rights through regulatory
mechanisms is predicated on evidence that feelings of having choice and control
over important aspects of one's own life produces tangible therapeutic benefits for
most individuals.
r0 3
Many persons involved in the long term care field consider OBRA 87's effect
of calling greater attention to residents' rights to be its most significant
accomplishment.'4 In contrast to these general perceptions, the available empirical
evidence reveals little about the effect of OBRA 87 on the actual exercise of
residents' rights. For instance,
[v]ery little is documented about whether OBRA 87 has had an impact on
the resident's right to choose a personal attending physician, the right to
receive medical care in privacy, the right to be able to contact the attending
physician, the right to be informed of his or her total health status, or the
right to refuse treatment. 5
Moreover, at times the current regulatory climate arguably acts as a barrier
impeding respect for resident autonomy, as providers believe that paternalistic
actions on their part (such as initiating guardianship proceedings that otherwise
might have been delayed or avoided)'06 are compelled by the providers' need for
prudent legal risk management.t 7 Put differently, many providers act-correctly
or not, but in almost every case sincerely-as though respecting residents'
decisional rights, especially decisions to take risks, will probably expose the
providers to malpractice claims brought by family members or regulatory citations
101. Kane, supra note 1, at 233.
102. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 ViLL L. REV.
1705,1755-68 (1992) (summarizing the literature on the psychology of choice); WINICK, THE RIGHTTo REFUSE,
supra note 59, at 328-37 (discussing the psychological value of choice).
104. Marek et al., supra note 82, at 31.
105. REBECCAD. ELON, Medical Practice in Nursing Facilities: Assessing the ImpactofOBRA, in QUALITY
CARE IN GERIATRIC SErnNGs 18,23 (Paul R. Katz et al. eds. 1995).
106. See Kapp, supra note 14, at 32-35.
107. See Jiska Cohen-Mansfield et al.. Autonomy for Nursing Home Residents: The Role of Regulations,
13 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 415 (1995).
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and sanctions at the hands of state surveyors in the event that the risks undertaken
should materialize.'08
The principle of autonomous decision making embodied in the OBRA 87
statute and regulations is supposed to apply with full force in the context of decision
making by and for the dying NF resident, and a feeling of being in control is
frequently very important to the quality of an individual's end-of-life experience.'09
Each year, approximately half a million NF residents die in the U.S." 0
Besides OBRA 87, Congress also enacted as part of the 1990 OBRA"'1 the
Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA)." 2 Applicable to all NFs" 3 that participate
in the Medicare or Medicaid programs, the PSDA was passed in the wake of the
United States Supreme Court's Cruzan decision" 4 to facilitate, indeed encourage,
health care consumers to execute advance medical directives in a timely fashion and
to encourage health care providers to respect and effectuate those advance
directives. " Regulations implementing the statute were promulgated shortly
thereafter by DHHS."
6
The results of these legislative and regulatory forays into better end-of-life care
have been, to characterize it charitably, a mixed bag in the NF setting. Referring to
OBRA 87 requirements, a nursing professor observes:
The current MDS and RAPS of the RAI omit important care needs of
residents during the living-dying interval, most notably pain, dyspnea,
spiritual/religious needs, bereavement, and hospice-type care. In addition
to these omissions, the RAPs and care plans triggered by the MDS may not
always be appropriate for terminally ill residents. MDS assessments on
108. See generally MARSHALLB. KAPP, OURHANDS ARETIED: LEGALTENsIONS ANDMEDICALETHICS 99-
100, 109-10 (1998) (discussing this source of legal anxiety for providers).
109. See A GOOD DEATH: SHAPING HEALTH CARE FOR THE LAST MONTHS OF LIFE (Joan K. Harrold &
Joanne Lynn eds., 1998) (discussing relationship between feelings of control and quality of life during the dying
process); ROGER C. BONE, REFL ONS: A GUIDETO END OFLIFE ISSUES FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY (1997)
(same); NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH AND DIGNITY (1993) (same).
110. See Dwight B. Brock & Daniel J. Foley, Demography and Epidemiology of Dying in the U.S. with
Emphasis on Deaths of Older People, 13 HOSPICE J. 49 (1998).
111. Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1997).
112. Id.
113. Nursing facilities as well as hospitals, home health agencies, health maintenance organizations,
preferred provider organizations, and hospices are included. See generally PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION IN
LONG-TERM CARE: IMPLEMENTINGTHE PSDA IN MEDICAL DECISIONS (Marshall B. Kapp ed., 1994) (discussing
application of the PSDA to nursing facilities and home health agencies).
114. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see Sandra H. Johnson, PSDA in
the Nursing Home, HASTINGS CENT. REP., Sept.-Oct 1991, at S3 (discussing implications of the PSDA in nursing
facilities in the wake of the Cruzan decision).
115. The literature on advance medical directives is voluminous. See, e.g., Bretton J. Horttor, A Survey of
Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives, 74 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 233 (1998) (summarizing the law on
advance directives); NANCY M.P. KING, MAKING SENSE OFADVANCEDIRECTIVES (1996) (providing an excellent
explanation of advance directives); CANTOR, supra note 109 (explaining advance directives).
116. 57 Fed. Reg. 8194 (1992).
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admission and quarterly thereafter may activate RAP triggers and care
plans for nutrition, feeding tubes, or hydration for a terminally ill resident
[even if such medical intervention contravenes the resident's own
wishes].'
17
Regarding the PSDA, one large study found that the legislation may have been
successful in increasing the use of advance care plans in NFs and in changing the
types of residents who use advance care plans; however, that investigation also
determined that the use of advance care plans is associated with organizational
characteristics, meaning that particular NFs may differ markedly in their
willingness and ability to address PSDA mandates.18 Another set of investigators
concluded that there is little evidence that the PSDA has enhanced completion of
advance directives by mentally capable residents after admission to the NF,
although the PSDA did have the effect of enhancing the documentation of
previously executed advance directives. 19 Others acknowledge difficult
impediments to implementation of the PSDA, 20 and particularly to expanded use
of advance directives in NFs, but are optimistic that those barriers eventually will
be overcome.1
2 '
The task of protecting the detailed residents' rights enumerated in federal and
state law falls largely, though not exclusively,' 2 to long-term care ombudsman
agencies. A national network of state long term care ombudsmen (ordinarily
operating within a state's department or office of aging), who in turn provide
coverage through contracts with either local public agencies or private
organizations, has been developed in the United States under the authority of the
117. Veronica F. Engle, Care of the Living, Care of the Dying: Reconceptualizing Nursing Home Care, 46
J. AM. GERiATRICS SOC'Y 1172,1173 (1998).
118. Nicholas G. Castle & Vincent Mor, Advance Care Planning in Nursing Homes: Pre- and Post-Patient
Self-Determination Act, HEALTH SERV. RES., Apr. 1998, at 101; see also Joan M. Teno et al., Changes in Advance
Care Planning in Nursing Homes Before and After the Patient Self-Determination Act: Report of a 10-State
Survey, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 939 (1997) (finding that implementation of the PSDA, as measured by
execution of advance directives, varied widely by geographic location). But see Mathy Mezey et al.,
Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) in Nursing Homes in New York City, 45 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 43 (1997) (finding that the number of advance directives per bed did not vary significantly
by facility size, ownership, religious affiliation, or whether or not the nursing home had a formal ethics
committee).
119. See Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., The Patient Self-Determination Act andAdvance Directive Completion
in Nursing ,Homes, 7 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 417 (1998); see also Elizabeth H. Bradley & John A. Rizzo, Public
Information and Private Search: Evaluating the Patient Self-Determination Act, 24 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L.
239 (1999) (finding that the effect of the law varies among identifiable subgroups).
120. For a discussion of potential implementation barriers, see Kapp, supra note 14, at 35-43.
121. Leslie Walker & Barbara Blechner, Continuing Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act
in Nursing Homes: Challenges, Opportunities, and Expectations, GENERATIONS, Winter 1995-1996, at 73, 73.
But see Connie Zuckerman, Looking Beyond the Law to Improve End-of-Life Care, GENERATIONS, Spring 1999,
at 30, 33 ("Legal 'solutions,' then, may not actually solve many of the real clinical dilemmas inherent in end-of-
life care.").
122. See Kayser-Jones & Kapp, supra note 12, at 362-74 (explaining a variety of advocacy possibilities).
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Older Americans Act.'2 As a condition of receiving OAA funds, each state is
required to establish and operate a program to: investigate and resolve NF resident
complaints; monitor laws, regulations, and policies relating to residents' rights;
promote citizen involvement concerning protection of residents' rights and provide
volunteer training; and inform public agencies of problems in NF care.1
24
Upon Congressional direction,'25 an exhaustive program evaluation conducted
by the Institute of Medicine reported:
On the basis of all the information it reviewed, collected, and analyzed, the
committee concludes that the ombudsman program serves a vital public
purpose. [However,] [i]n its assessment, the committee identified
considerable barriers to effective performance that the ombudsman
programs encounter. Significant among these are inadequate funding,
resulting staff shortages, low salary levels for paid staff, structural conflicts
of interest that limit the ability to act, and uneven implementation within
and across states.1
26
This generally positive evaluation of ombudsman programs (albeit not without
some reservations) is shared by others, such as social policy commentator Joel
Handler:
In general, the presence of an ombudsman program enhances the quality of
life and the care of nursing home residents. Apparently the mere presence
of concerned outsiders increases the staff's sense of importance and
motivation. In addition, attention to the needs of the residents enhances
their status in the eyes of the staff, which results in greater respect and
better care. [This] [p]resence also brings home to the staff and the
administrators the fact of their accountability.'17
C. Restraints
Perhaps the most important change intended by supporters of OBRA 87 and its
implementing regulations concerned the permissible use of physical and chemical
123. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3027(a)(12)(A)(i) (WVest Supp. 1999). For a thorough overview of the theory, practice,
and history of the long term care ombudsman program, see INSrrrtm oF MEDICINE, REAL PEOPLE, REAL
PROBLEMS: AN EVALUATION OFTHE LONG-TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAMS OFTHE OLDER AMERICAN ACT
41-77 (1995) [hereinafter IOM REAL PROBLEMS].
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3027 (West Supp. 1999).
125. IOM REAL PROBLEMS, supra note 123.
126. l. at 161.
127. HANDLER, supra note 65, at 154.
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restraints on residents in NFs. Unlike the status quo ante,128 today a resident has the
right to be free from any physical restraints imposed for the purpose of discipline
or staff convenience, rather than imposed under a physician's order to treat the
resident's medical problems after less restrictive or intrusive interventions have
been considered and attempted unsuccessfully. 129 The same statutory and regulatory
restriction applies to psychotropic drugs, 30 which have (in the not very distant past)
commonly been administered to NF residents as chemical restraints rather than as
a thoughtful, unavoidable piece of the particular resident's therapeutic plan.'3 '
Similar provisions restricting the permissible scope of physical and chemical
restraints appear in the "Resident Bill of Rights" adopted by each state.'32
In this context, there is widespread consensus that the government's "command
and control" intrusion has made a powerful, positive difference in provider
conduct. 133 Regarding the use of physical restraints in the NF setting, an ambitious
study of pre- and post-OBRA '87 NF resident cohorts found a twenty-five percent
decline in the use of restraints as a probable result of the RAI requirement."3 Most
members of the nursing home industry have shown tremendous creativity in
developing and implementing suitable alternatives to the use of physical restraints
128. See, e.g., Mary E. Tinetti et al., Mechanical Restraint Use Among Residents of Skilled Nursing
Facilities: Prevalence, Patterns, and Predictors, 265 JAMA 468 (1991) (regarding the earlier widespread
prevalence of NF restraints); Lois K. Evans & Neville E. Strumpf, Tying Down the Elderly: A Review of the
Literature on Physical Restraint, 37J. AM. GERIATRICSSOC'Y 65 (1989) (providing an excellent historical account
of physical restraint use).
129. 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(a)(2000); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1999) (Medicare) and
1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1999) (Medicaid).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn et al., Use of Psychoactive Medications and Quality of Care in Rest Homes, 320
NEW ENG. J. MED. 227 (1989) (regarding the previous prevalence of chemical restraints in NFs); Wayne A. Ray,
et al., A Study ofAntipsychotic Drug Use in Nursing Homes: Epidemiologic Evidence Suggesting Misuse, 70 AM.
3. PUB. HEALTH 485 (1980) (finding drugs often overused as chemical restraints).
132. See Marshall B. Kapp, Nursing Home Restraints and Legal Liability: Merging the Standard of Care
and Industry Practice, 13 J. LEGAL MEE. 1, 21-22 n.113 (1992) (citing state statutes presenting the permissible
use of restraints in NFs).
133. See, e.g., ELON, supra note 105, at 23-28 (concluding that OBRA has led to a reduction in the use of
inappropriate restraints in nursing facilities); Robert L. Kane et al., Restraining Restraints: Changes in a Standard
of Care, 14 ANNUAL REV. PUB. HEALTH 545 (1993) (reasoning that physical restraint use has fallen because of
OBRA). But see Nicholas G. Castle & Vincent Mor, Physical Restraints in Nursing Homes: A Review of the
Literature Since the Nursing Home Reform Act of,1987,55 MED. CARERES. &REv. 139,140 (1998) (finding that:
implementation of restraint reduction varies widely, and there still is some concern that
physical restraints are overused in some facilities. There was significant resistance to
reducing restraints, and the majority of facilities are not restraint free. Moreover, isolated
examples of facilities abandoning restraint-free care and becoming significant users of
physical restraints have been documented.).
134. Hawes et aL, supra note 75, at 982; accord Farida K. Ejaz et al., Restraint Reduction: Can It Be
Achieved? 34 GERONTOLOGIST 694 (1994).
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in manifold circumstances. 35 In terms of proving a direct cause and effect
relationship between regulation and actual practice, an investigative team that
interviewed NF administrators in four states reported that:
The participants in our study indicated that complying with OBRA
guidelines and satisfying the scrutiny of the state surveyors' inspection was
an important reason to reduce restraint use. Indeed, administrators ranked
a deficiency-free survey as one of the most beneficial aspects of restraint-
free care. Most of the facilities did well with the state surveyors in terms
of restraint use and restraint-free alternatives.
13 6
Moreover, lower rates of restraint use appear to have been achieved with no
increase in serious resident injuries,'37 economic costs, t38 or legal liability exposure
for the NF.139 Further, when restraints have been removed, with independence and
rehabilitation encouraged as an alternative, the functional status of many
residents-in terms of being capable of carrying out Activities of Daily Living
(ADLs)-improves.Y'4 Thus, the causal connection between iniprovements in the
process of care and improved resident outcomes appears established.
There is convincing evidence from single and multiple institution studies that
current federal and state laws limiting allowable prescription of psychotropic drugs
in NFs have largely accomplished the policy objective of reducing the number of
such prescriptions.' 4 ' It is particularly noteworthy that reductions in the usage of
135. Joan M. Dunbar et al., Retrain, Don't Restrain: The Educational Intervention of the National Nursing
Home Restraint Removal Project, 36 GERONTOLOGIsT 539 (1996); Perla Werner et al., Individualized Care
Alternatives Used in the Process of Removing Physical Restraints in the Nursing Home, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS
Soc'Y 321 (1994).
136. Joan M. Dunbar et al., Taking Charge: The Role of Nursing Administrators in Removing Restraints,
27 JONA 42,44 (1997).
137. Mary E. Tinetti et al., Mechanical Restraint Use and Fall-related Injuries among Residents of Skilled
Nursing Facilities, 116 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 369 (1992); see also Richard R. Neufeld et al., Restraint Reduces
Serious Injuries Among Nursing Home Residents, 47 J. AM. GERJATRICS SoC'Y 1202 (1999).
138. Charles D. Phillips et al., Reducing the Use of Physical Restraints in Nursing Homes: Will It Increase
Costs? 83 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 342 (1993).
139. Marsha!! B. Kapp, Restraint Reduction and Legal Risk Management, 47 J. AM. GERIATRIcs oc'Y 375
(1999).
140. See, e.g., Richard R. Neufeld &Joan M. Dunbar, Restraint Reduction: Where Are We Now?, NURSINo
HOME ECON., May-June 1997, at 11, 12 (arguing that the ability of residents to participate in daily activities
improves when restraints are removed).
141. See, e.g., Nicholas G. Castle, Changes in Resident and Facility Risk Factors for Psychotropic Drug
Use in Nursing Homes Since the Nursing Home Reform Act, 18 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 77 (1999) (presenting
a multiple institution study showing reduced use of drugs since OBRA); Maria D. Llorente et al., Use of
Antipsychotic Drugs in Nursing Homes: Current Compliance with OBRA Regulations, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS
SOC'Y 198 (1998) (same); Melinda S. Lantz et al., A Ten-Year Review of the Effect of OBRA-87 on Psychotropic
Prescribing Practices in an Academic Nursing Home, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 951 (1996) (providing a study in
one nursing facility showing a reduced use of drugs since the enactment of OBRA); Judith Garrard et al., The
Impact of the 1987 Federal Regulations on the Use of Psychotropic Drugs in Minnesota Nursing Homes, 85 AM.
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drugs as chemical restraints has been effected at exactly the same time that physical
restraint use has diminished as well, thus negating the early speculation that NFs
might simply substitute one form of restraint for another. 42 Even when OBRA '87
mandates have not been uniformly effective, they have at least increased awareness
among caregivers of the proper indications for neuroleptics. 43
A precise cause and effect relationship between regulation and drug usage is
complicated, though, by the advent of a newer generation of psychotropics which
might have influenced professional prescribing patterns even in the absence of a
regulatory obligation to rethink customary practice.' 44 Nevertheless, HCFA has
concluded:
The magnitude and timing of the trend data in the use of
psychopharmacologic medications combined with the results of separate
studies designed to assess OBRA '87 impact indicate that the positive
changes observed were due to OBRA'87. This is particularly true for some
domains; for example, with respect to the utilization of antipsychotic and
antidepressant medications drug categories that were specifically targeted
in the OBRA '87 regulations and guidelines. [Other factors were important,
too.] These other factors, however, were not in and of themselves sufficient
to change the general pattern of inappropriate use of psychopharmacologic
medications in nursing homes. Only with the implementation of the OBRA
'87 was an abrupt change for the better seen. Hence, it appears that
regulation was at least a necessary condition for the improvements
observed.
145
Several sets of authors, while applauding reduced reliance on the prescribing
of psychotropic drugs for NF residents as a positive process measure, urge the need
to conduct additional research to determine the effects, if any, of this reduction on
tangible resident outcomes.' 46 Put accurately, albeit bluntly:
J. PuB. HEALTH 771 (1995) (detailing the conclusion that nursing facilities in Minnesota have had a reduced use
of drugs since OBRA); Todd P. Semla et al., Effect of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act 1987 on Antipsychotic
Prescribing in Nursing Home Residents, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 648 (1994) (explaining a multiple
institution study showing reduced use of drugs since OBRA).
142. Eugenia L. Siegler et al., Effects of a Restraint Reduction Intervention and OBRA '87 Regulations on
Psychoactive Drug Use in Nursing Homes, 45 . AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 791 (1997).
143. 1&
144. See Robert A. Lasser & Trey Sunderland, Newer Psychotropic Medication Use in Nursing Home
Residents, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOc'Y 202 (1998) (describing the latest generation of psychotropic medications
being used in nursing facilities).
145. HCFA, supra note 7, at 22.
146. Soo Borson & Kenneth Doane, The Impact of OBRA-87 on Psychotropic Drug Prescribing in Skilled
Nursing Facilities, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1289, 1295 (1997); Ronald I. Shorr, et al., Changes in Antipsychotic
Drug Use in Nursing Homes During Implementation of the OBRA-87 Regulations, 271 JAMA 358, 362 (1994).
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Unfortunately, the implementation of these regulations on a national scale
was done without concurrent provision for the evaluation of their effect on
patient outcomes; thus, it is one of the largest uncontrolled health care
experiments of modem times.147
D. Access to Mental Health Care
A section of OBRA '87 requires facility prescreening of all prospective NF
admittees and prohibits admission of individuals with mental illness (except for
dementia) 148 or mental retardation unless they specifically need NF services. 149 This
provision is referred to as the PASARR requirement, for Preadmission Screening
and Annual Resident Review. 50 This legislation was enacted largely as a response
to the questionable public policy of vigorously deinstitutionalizing patients out of
public mental institutions over the previous two decades; by 1980, NFs were caring
for ninety-four percent of all institutionalized mentally ill elderly persons.'
PASARR was intended to prevent inappropriate warehousing in NFs of mentally
ill and mentally retarded persons (widely believed to be the inevitable fate if
government did not intervene), 52 and to ensure that previously underserved
147. Jerry Avom & Jerry H. Gurwitz, Drug Use in the Nursing Home, 123 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 195, 197
(1995); see also Carmel M. Hughes, et al., Impact of Legislation on Nursing Home Care in the United States:
Lessons for the United Kingdom, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 1060, 1061 (1999) (referring to psychotropic medications,
"[t]he United Kingdom may be better suited to an approach that focuses on achieving quality prescribing through
education, as regulation to promote change does not necessarily promote quality.").
148. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r(e)(7)(G)(i) (West Supp. 1999) (providing that:
An individual is considered to be "mentally ill" if the individual has a serious mental illness (as defined
by the Secretary [ofDHHS] in consultation with the National Institute of Mental Health) and does not
have a primary diagnosis of dementia (including Alzheimer's disease or a related disorder) or a
diagnosis (other than a primary diagnosis) of dementia and a primary diagnosis that is not a serious
mental illness.).
149. Id. §§ 1396r (b)(3)(F) (requirements for facilities), 1396r(e)(7) (requirements for states), 1396r(f)(8)
(requirements for DHHS).
150. The annual review requirement was repealed by Pub. L. 105-33.
151. MENTALHEALTHPOLICYFOROLDERAMERICANS: PROTECTINGMINDS ATRISK 63.84(1990); see also
G.RALDN.GROB,FROMASYLUMTOCOMMUNITY:MENTALHEALTHPOLICYINMODERN AMFjCA268-69 (1991)
(detailing the transinstitutionalization process from public mental institution to nursing facility); GERALD N.
GROB, ME MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OFTHE CARE OF AMERICA'S MENTALLY ILL (1994) (same).
152. Chester H. Jakubiak, Jr.&JamesJ. Callahan, Jr., Treatment ofMentalDisordersAmongNursingHome
Residents: Will the Market Provide? GENERATIONS, Winter 1995-1996, at 39, 41. Cf. C.C. Colenda et al., The
Impact of OBRA-87 on Psychiatric Services in Nursing Homes, 7 AM. J. GERIATRIC PsYCHIATRY 12 (1999)
(recommending the development of outcome measurements to assess the quality of mental health services in
nursing homes).
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mentally disabled residents153 are treated more appropriately, with "specialized
services" provided at the state's expense.
54
In the wake of PASARR's enactment, a number of mental health professionals
speculated that the new requirements likely would have the effect of displacing a
substantial number of NFresidents who would then, literally, have no place to go. 55
While the scenario of numerous older mentally ill and mentally retarded former NF
residents rendered homeless as a result of PASARR requirements does not appear
to have developed, appraisals of our experience with this legislation's actual impact
on NF residents' access to appropriate mental health services are, at best, only
mixed. 56 Indeed, "PASARR has been among the most criticized of all nursing
home reforms. It is expensive and intrusive. Most significantly, it appears to have
had little effect on the composition of the nursing home population.' 57 Even the
PASARR legislation's most enthusiastic pro-regulatory fans deplore the "failure to
fulfill Congress' vision" in practice, 158 lamenting limitations on the class of people
protected, harm caused by exempting individuals with dementia, lax enforcement
by HCFA, states' failure to provide community-based alternatives for individuals
who do not need NF placement, and HCFA's narrow definition of "specialized
services."'
159
153. See NANCY B. EMERSON LOMBARDO ET AL, ACHIEVING MENTAL HEALTH OF NURSING HOME
RESIDENTS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO MENTAL HEALTH CARE (1996) (arguing that nursing facility residents
are badly underserved when it comes to mental health care).
154. For a description of Congressional intent in the PASARR provisions, see Beth Pepper & Deborah P.
Rubenstein, What Preadnission Screening and Annual Resident Review Means for Older People with Mental
Illness, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1447, 1447-49 (1994). Fora description of the intended operation of the statute,
see MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, 2 ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF OLDER PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES:
PREADMISSION SCREENINGANDANNUALRESIDENTREVIEW (1993); ROBERTBERNSTEINETAL, MENTALHEALTH
LAW PROJECT, MAKING CHOICES: CHALLENGES FORADVOCATES AND ELDERLY NURSING HOME RESIDENTS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS (1991).
155. See, e.g., Mary Avellone Eichmann et al., An Estimation of the Impact of OBRA-87 on Nursing Home
Care in the United States, 43 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 781 (1992) (expressing concern about
widespread homelessness among mentally ill nursing facility residents); Marc P. Freiman et al., Nursing Home
Reform and the Mentally 111, 9 HEALTH AFF. 47 (1990) (same).
156. Kathryn B. McGrew, The Nursing Home as Mental Health Care Provider: The Mixed Message and
Impact of Nursing Home Reform, PUB. POL'Y & AGING REP., Winter 1998, at 1, 1 ("Newly emerging research and
ongoing public debate suggest that reforms have achieved only mixed success and that we have a long way to go
before we have a nursing home system fully responsive to the mental health needs of nursing home residents.");
Clare Collins et al., From Policy to Practice: Mental Health Treatment ReceivedAmong Depressed Nursing Home
Residents Who Had a Preadnission (OBRA) Evaluation, Special Issue 1, 39 GERONTOLOGIST 366, 366 (1999).
157. McGrew, supra note 156, at 18; accord Mark Snowden & Peter Roy-Byrne, Mental Illness and Nursing
Home Reform: OBRA-87 Ten Years Later, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 229 (1998); Mark Snowden et al., Compliance
with PASARR Recommendations for Medicaid Recipients in Nursing Homes, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1132
(1998).
158. Pepper & Rubenstein, supra note 154, at 1449.
159. Id at 1450-55.
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IV. FUTURE ISSUES AND INQUIRIES
The regulation of NFs is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end. The
exact nature and extent of the command and control regulatory environment
engulfing NF care ought to be formulated on the basis of evidence about the impact
of various governmental interventions on the lives of residents, not as a response
to political ideology or bureaucratic convenience. The industry's complaints of
"[w]e don't like regulation" should carry no more presumptive weight in public
policy formulation than the cries of often self-anointed' resident advocates that
"[w]e don't trust the marketplace." An antidogmatic approach will keep the debate
going and the inquiry open.16 1 Our ultimate policy objective should be to match, as
finely as possible, specific regulatory mandates with desired, beneficial outcomes,
while allowing all parties involved maximum flexibility to pursue those goals. 62
Some measurement of the impact thus far of current regulations on the quality
of NF care, at least in terms of process indicators, has been attempted and available
results have been reviewed in this Article. The body of evidence collected is
suggestive of some success, but on the whole is quite inconclusive. According to
one gerontological researcher, "I also believe that some improvement has occurred.
However, the degree of this success is very much open to debate, and paper
compliance encouraged by the regulatory system may even be counter-productive
to efforts to be innovative in changing resident care.'' 63
Even the leading empirical research team in this arena admits that its work is
incomplete. The researchers caution:
[O]ur measures do not represent a full range of the processes of care that
may be important to the quality of care received by residents and may
affect their outcomes. Moreover, they are insufficient to capture adequate
indicators of process quality in the area of quality of life. For example, we
did not measure such critical aspects of process quality as the nature of
staff-resident interactions nor resident satisfaction. Given the goals of the
160. Cf THoMAS SOWELL, VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL
POLICY (1995) (criticizing unelected individuals and groups who "anoint" themselves to formulate public policy
because they have contempt for the wisdom of common people working through the normal democratic
processes).
161. See POSNER, supra note 58, at 6 (arguing for an antidogmatic approach to questions about the proper
extent of law's involvement in our lives).
162. Kane, supra note 1, at 236-37.
163. John F. Schnelle, Can Nursing Homes Use the MDS to Improve Quality? 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y
1027, 1028 (1997); see also John F. Schnelle et al., Policy Without Technology: A Barrier to Improving Nursing
Home Care, 37 GERONTOLOGIST 527 (1997) (arguing that standards of care for nursing facilities are written
without realistic assessment regarding the existence of an intervention protocol and without determining whether
resources are available to meet those standards). Such a situation produces unfair pressure on nursing facilities.
Id. The NFs then react with paper compliance strategies, creating barriers to implementing new interventions that
do meet care standards once developed. Id.
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OBRA nursing home reforms, these aspects of process quality and whether
they have improved deserve further sttidy.t64
Avorn and Gurwitz remind us of the need to concentrate on outcome measures:
[G]iven the proliferation of federal regulations governing drug use in the
long-term care setting, research on the optimal mix of regulation,
credentialing, and education is needed to improve the outcomes of drug
therapy in nursing home residents. It is particularly important to document
the clinical consequences of changes in prescribing rather than simply
considering the end point of an intervention to be the changes
themselves."t
This Article has suggested the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence as one analytic
lens for use in conducting the necessary outcomes-focused inquiry.
The results of such an inquiry are essential to inform, but could never be
sufficient to conclude, the formulation of sound public policy, since value choices
concerning the acceptable mix of competing benefits and costs must ultimately
determine the government's role. Most importantly, whatever government's role
and any salutary influence it brings to bear on the quality of care and quality of life
for NF residents, regulation by itself will always be inadequate to the task. This
author has cautioned elsewhere that, ".... [h]uman loving-kindness.., cannot be
legislated in an age of legal minimalism."'6 Regulatory requirements may be
essential to inspire, but can never substitute for, the sense of moral obligation that,
in the final analysis, must lie at the heart of protecting and promoting the well-being
of our most vulnerable citizens. 67
164. Hawes, supra note 75, at 983-84.
165. Avorn & Gurwitz, supra note 148, at 203; see also William D. Spector & Dana B. Mukamel, Using
Outcomes to Make Inferences About Nursing Home Quality, 21 EVALUATION & HEALTH PROFESSIONS 291 (1998)
(discussing the need to integrate research with outcome-based quality assurance systems to allow ongoing
evaluation and quality improvement in nursing facilities).
166. Kapp, supra note 14, at 46.
167. Elias Cohen, Legal Obligations/Moral Obligations: Elusive Cross Connections in Long Term Care,
5 CoNmTFp. GERONTOLOGY 39 (1998).

